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COPY NO.

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J.C.S. 1887/302

15 November 1956

DECLASSIFIED BY:  
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH  
DATE 19 Aug 77

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON J.C.S. 1887/302

A Report by the Joint Middle East Planning Committee  
(In collaboration with the Joint Intelligence Committee)

on

BAGHDAD PACT PLANNING STAFF STUDY ON "COMMUNIST INSPIRED THREAT  
TO WEST PAKISTAN IN CONDITIONS SHORT OF GLOBAL WAR"

Note by the Secretaries.

1. On 14 November 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the  
recommendations in paragraphs 9 and 10 of J.C.S. 1887/302.

2. The message in Enclosure "A" was dispatched as JCS 913509,  
dated 15 November 1956, to the Chief, Baghdad Pact Liaison Group.  
Copies of this paper are being forwarded to CINCNELM and CINCPAC.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached  
as the top sheet of J.C.S. 1887/302.

R. D. WENTWORTH,

H. L. HILLYARD,

Joint Secretariat.

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(11-19-47)

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J.C.S. 1887/302

7 November 1956

Pages 2283 - 2283, incl.

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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

DATE 11 July 77

REPORT BY THE JOINT MIDDLE EAST PLANNING COMMITTEE  
(In collaboration with the Joint Intelligence Committee)

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

BAGHDAD PACT PLANNING STAFF STUDY ON "COMMUNIST INSPIRED THREAT  
TO WEST PAKISTAN IN CONDITIONS SHORT OF GLOBAL WAR"

Reference: J.C.S. 1887/203

See Corr'd dtd 11-8-56.  
See Declassification dtd 11-15-56.

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BAGHDAD PACT PLANNING STAFF STUDY ON "COMMUNIST INSPIRED  
THREAT TO WEST PAKISTAN IN CONDITIONS SHORT OF GLOBAL WAR"

THE PROBLEM

1. To comment on the study, "Communist Inspired Threat to West Pakistan in Conditions Short of Global War", (BP/MIDMIL/MP/2/D12)\* prepared by the Baghdad Pact Planning Staff.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 19 April 1955, the offer of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on Baghdad Pact Studies was accepted by the Baghdad Pact Military Committee\*\*.

3. On 9 October 1955, the U.S. Military Observer to the Baghdad Pact forwarded\*\*\* copies of the Pact Study, "Communist Inspired Threat to West Pakistan in Conditions Short of Global War"\* to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.

DISCUSSION

4. Pact planners trace the development of the threat to West Pakistan from a demand in 1947 by Afghanistan for the creation of a separate Pathan State (Pakhtoonistan) within newly created Pakistan to the present economic and military penetration of Afghanistan by the USSR.

5. The study points out that Soviet support for a limited war against Pakistan (in support of the Pakhtoonistan demand) right, through the creation of a Pakhtoonistan state with borders on the Arabian Sea, place the Soviets in the position of sitting astride Pakistan land communications with Iran, and of posing a threat to the sea lines of communication in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

6. Current Soviet projects in Afghanistan such as highway and airfield improvements, construction of petroleum storage sites

\* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat; see Enclosure to J.C.S. 1887/288.

\* USARMA IRAQ MSG to JCS C-51, (DAIN 217267) DTG 190558Z 19 April 1956; on file in Joint Secretariat.

\*\*\* Enclosure to J.C.S. 1887/288

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and pipelines on major routes leading to Pakistan; and Soviet offers of training aircraft and technical assistance to the Royal Afghan Air Force are used in support of the Planners' conclusions that there exists a serious Communist inspired and aided limited war threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan. 4

7. For additional discussion, see Enclosure "B".

#### CONCLUSION

8. Although the military and economic capabilities of Afghanistan are believed to be exaggerated in the Pact Study, the Baghdad Pact Planners' conclusion that a potential communist inspired and aided limited war threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan exists is considered valid.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff send the message in Enclosure "A", which reflects the above conclusion, to the Chief, Baghdad Pact Liaison Group.

10. It is recommended that copies of this paper be furnished CINCNELM and CINCPAC.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MESSAGE FOR THE CHIEF BAGHDAD PACT LIAISON GROUP  
(USARMA, BAGHDAD, IRAQ, FOR DELIVERY)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed Pact Study "The Communist Inspired Threat to West Pakistan in Conditions Short of Global War (BP/MIDMIL/MP/2/D12)"\* which estimates the nature and extent of a limited war threat to West Pakistan from Afghanistan, together with a concept of enemy operations.
2. It is requested that you forward the comment set forth below to the Baghdad Pact Planning Staff with the understanding that no commitment or obligation on the part of the United States is implied or incurred.
3. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the Pact Study reflects an adequate appreciation of the problem.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

DISCUSSION

The following U.S. intelligence estimate is pertinent:

a. Present estimate of Afghan ground forces is 64,000 of which 44,000 are Army troops (approximately 29 Brigade groups) and the remaining 20,000 are Gendarmerie. No organized reserve exists; however, an estimated 250,000-275,000 men have undergone two years military service and are probably still fit for military duty. Forty-five percent of the Army strength, including the best trained and equipped units, are concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Kabul, and only thirty percent is estimated as being disposed in the eastern and southeastern portion of the country adjoining Pakistan. The remaining strength is divided among several provincial garrisons.

b. With respect to the threat from tribes on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border, males within the ages 14-49 are estimated at 2,700,000 and a physically fit male potential of 1,400,000. Based upon limitations imposed by availability of unorganized reserves, arms and equipment, training, cadres and facilities, administrative mechanisms, and economic considerations, a mobilization of 100,000 troops under arms could be realized by M+150. With outside logistical support, the maximum mobilization capacity of 150,000 troops under arms probably could not be reached until M+2 years.

c. A potential additional reserve among tribesmen would number only about 140,000. Probably only selected tribes could be counted upon to support the Army against Pakistan at present. Many tribes resist the dictates of the Afghan Royal Family or any form of governmental control. Moreover, cooperation among tribes is slight.

d. Pakistan's control of the tribesmen is believed to be sufficiently strong to prevent any large scale uprising on the Pakistan side of the border. Further, Pakistan tribesmen are

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Enclosure "B"



the event of repair or improvement inasmuch as a potential requirement for use of heavy aircraft also exists at these airfields.

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being gradually won over by the Pakistan Government to a more settled way of life.

e. Although arms and ammunition reportedly have been received recently from the Soviet bloc, it is unlikely that they have been absorbed into the active army units in sufficient quantities to warrant the statement that an increased capability will be realized "in the near future". The types of equipment to be received under the Soviet bloc arms deals have not been revealed. It is anticipated that they will receive small arms and artillery, and possibly some light tanks or armored cars and piston fighter aircraft.

f. Until recently, the Royal Afghan Air Force consisted of less than twenty-five piston type aircraft. On 26 October 1955, however, about eleven MIG jet aircraft (which may be training types) arrived at a northern Afghanistan airfield bearing Afghanistan military markings. A few Afghan pilots who have received jet training in India, and possibly the USSR, are available to assist in training the less advanced Afghan pilots.

8 November 1956

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

HOLDERS OF J.C.S. 1887/302

(Baghdad Pact Planning Staff Study on "Communist  
Inspired Threat to West Pakistan in  
Conditions Short of Global War")

CORRIGENDUM

✓ Holders of J.C.S. 1887/302 are requested to delete  
the word "Iraq" in the second footnote on page 2284, and  
✓ to substitute the word "Iran" therefor.

R. D. WENTWORTH,

H. L. HILLYARD,

Joint Secretariat.